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JUDICIAL SCRUTINY IN PUBLIC FORUM CASES: MISPLACED
TRUST IN THE JUDGMENT OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
DAVID GOLDBERGER*
INTRODUCTION
The problem of resolving the inevitable conflicts between pub-
lic demonstrations and governmental interests in the orderly use of
public forums exists in every democratic society. For each group of
demonstrators that wishes to assemble on a street corner and dis-
seminate its ideas, there is always a public official responsible for
assuring that the demonstration will be peaceful and will not dis-
rupt competing activities. Fair and efficient resolution of such con-
flicts requires development of a rational and stable regulatory
framework. Presumably, such a framework generates decisions
which fairly and consistently balance interests in communication
against interests in social order; it also minimizes ad hoc regulatory
decisions which are a product of pressures and biases of the
moment.
Since the resolution of conflicts between speech and regulatory
interests requires a balancing of important competing social and
constitutional policies, courts inevitably assume an extremely im-
portant role in the decision-making process. The United States Su-
preme Court has played the dominant role. It has developed the
"time, place, and manner" doctrine as a guide to regulation of
speech activities in public forums.1 The doctrine embodies the
*Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University College of Law; B.A. 1963, Uni-
versity of Chicago; J.D. 1967, University of Chicago. Former Legal Director American Civil
Liberties Union, Illinois Division 1970-73, 1975-80. I am deeply in debt to Professors Neil
Komesar and Geoffrey Stone as well as Professors Peter Gerhart, Rhonda Rivera, and Allan
Samansky whose suggestions and encouragement at the various stages of the writing of this
article were invaluable.
1. One of the first cases to articulate the "time, place and manner" doctrine was Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1940), where the Court held that a New Hampshire
statute prohibiting a parade or procession upon a public street without a special license did
not contravene constitutional rights of freedom of speech and assembly. The Court con-
strued the statute to limit the state's licensing authority to considerations of whether the
4"time, place, and manner" of the proposed assembly would "unduly disturb" other public
uses of the streets. For further discussion of Cox, see infra notes 37-40 and accompanying
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Court's view of an effective approach which balances the relevant
competing interests. First, the doctrine protects the exchange of
ideas in public places by prohibiting regulation that censors or oth-
erwise regulates the communication of ideas because of official ob-
jections to content. Second, it authorizes government officials to
impose content-neutral regulations on demonstrations to protect
significant state interests unrelated to speech.' Thus, regulations
"justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech"
can be imposed on forum activites to assure that the activities are
orderly and do not unduly interfere with competing uses of the
same or nearby locations.' This doctrine is usually cast in the fol-
lowing terms: "[A]ctivities . . .protected by the First Amendment
are subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.
'4
The generally accepted view among constitutional scholars is
that judicial application of the time, place, and manner doctrine is
characterized by two different levels of judicial scrutiny.5 At the
higher level of scrutiny, any restriction that delegates unlimited
discretion to forum regulators is presumed to be unconstitutional.6
The Court presumes, without requiring actual proof, that such re-
strictions will be used discriminatorily or unnecessarily to burden
the flow of communication.
text.
For a discussion of the doctrine which evolved from Cox, see Kalven, The Concept of the
Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 10-29 (consideration of the time,
place, and manner of a proposed assembly authorizes regulation only of its timing, and not
the content of what is said; the courts must carefully weigh the impact of the regulation on
the right of free speech); see also Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MicH. L.
REV. 1481, 1486-92 (1970) (criticism of Cox for the discretion left with public officials who
need not determine anything more concrete than that a proposed assembly will "unduly"
disturb public convenience, and who may require consequent changes in the time, place, and
manner of the assembly); Stone, Fora Americana, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233, 239-56 (Cox deci-
sion became part of a workable theory of use of the public forum which succeeded for two
decades by emphasizing regulation over prohibition).
2. Kalven, supra note 1, at 26-28.
3. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648
(1981).
4. Id. at 647.
5. See L. TnIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 12-2 to 12-6 (1978); Ely, Flag Dese-
cration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1484-90 (1975). Cf. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) (suggesting the emergence of an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny in equal protection cases).
6. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-52 (1938).
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In contrast, forum restrictions containing standards which
confine official discretion are subjected to a much lower level of
judicial scrutiny.7 At the lower level of judicial scrutiny, any re-
striction characterized by specific language aimed at protecting
nonspeech regulatory interests is presumed to be constitutional.
This presumption frees the state from any obligation to produce
specific proof of actual or anticipated harm to regulatory interests
in order to justify a restriction. A speaker who wishes to challenge
such a restriction bears the burden of proving that it is discrimina-
tory or arbitrary. For example, a restriction which by its terms spe-
cifically prohibits "leafletting" in intersections of busy streets in
order to avoid traffic disruption is presumed valid without proof by
the state that the leafletting actually interferes with traffic.8
Although judicial scrutiny in public forum cases is often char-
acterized as extremely high or extremely low, the Article will
demonstrate that judicial scrutiny is more accurately characterized
as falling on a continuum. It will show that the Court varies the
level of scrutiny to accommodate the particular facts under review.
The public forum cases will be looked at individually and, as a re-
sult, several identifiable levels of scrutiny will emerge. Taken to-
gether, these different levels fall on a continuum. The continuum is
generated by the Court's propensity to employ maximum levels of
scrutiny when reviewing a regulation which is an actual or poten-
tial tool of censorship; as evidence accumulates that a forum regu-
lation has content-neutral goals, the level of scrutiny declines
accordingly.
No matter what level of scrutiny is employed in an individual
case, the critical inquiry is whether a regulation is content-neutral.
If the regulation is not content-neutral because it authorizes or im-
plements a policy of censorship, the Court presumes that the cen-
sorship will in fact occur.9 The Court therefore rejects the regula-
tion as untrustworthy, and automatically overrules any official
claims that it serves valid governmental interests. 10 Conversely,
7. Professor Tribe characterizes this as the equivalent of minimal due process scrutiny.
L. TRIBE, supra note 5, § 12-2.
8. United States Labor Party v. Oremus, 619 F.2d 683, 687-88 (7th Cir. 1980).
9. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) ("It is not merely the sporadic
abuse of power by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that
constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion.")
10. Although none of the scholars who have examined the time, place, and manner doc-
trine have explicitly done so in terms of the trustworthiness of different regulatory deci-
1983]
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when a regulation appears to be content-neutral, the Court
presumes that the censorship will not occur. It therefore sustains
the regulation as a trustworthy effort to protect legitimate govern-
mental interests.
The purpose of this Article is to challenge the view that con-
tent-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions protecting state
interests provide the trustworthy protection of speech interests
that the Supreme Court appears to assume. The Article demon-
strates that the Supreme Court's formulation and application of
the time, place, and manner doctrine frequently undercuts speech
interests by authorizing remarkably broad, unsupervised discretion
by forum regulators.11 Furthermore, frequent use of the low levels
of judicial review authorized by the time, place, and manner doc-
trine for examination of content-neutral restrictions allows and
even encourages forum regulators to favor regulatory interests over
speech interests. Low levels of scrutiny particularly insulate the
strong inclinations of forum regulators to construct restrictions
that disadvantage controversial communication. Thus, the current
mode of judicial scrutiny places no significant judicial restraint on
the natural tendency of forum regulators to impose unnecessary
content-neutral restrictions on any activities which they believe
might cause trouble or violence.
The Article concludes that the Supreme Court's approach to
the review of forum restrictions should be modified. It proposes
sions, they seem to assume implicitly that trustworthiness is an essential element of judicial
analysis. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 5, at 1496-1502. The assumption of trustworthiness of
legislative decision-makers seemed central to the holding in United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968), which upheld a law prohibiting the destruction of draft cards against a first
amendment challenge. In O'Brien, the Court reluctantly sustained a legislative policy judg-
ment that possession of draft cards was essential to the administration of the selective ser-
vice system-even though the judgment was not entirely convincing. Because the Court
found that the Government's claim of need for the law was plausible, it felt constrained to
trust the wisdom of the legislative process which enacted the law. Id. at 376-77, 381.
11. The term "forum regulators" infludes all public officials including administrators
and legislators who enact or enforce restrictions on use of public places for public communi-
cation. Both legislators and administrators are confronted with the same policy questions
when imposing restrictions on the use of forums. They must design laws and impose restric-
tions that protect state property, governmental operations, and public safety. While the leg-
islator enacts a law "for all time" and a regulator is more concerned with individual cases,
both engage in the same process of reconciling competing interests in a fashion that protects
those interests that they consider most important. Because they are executing the same
task-making decisions governing use of public forums-they are ultimately subject to simi-
lar pressures and incentives.
178 [Vol. 32
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that the Court abandon its erroneous assumption that content-
neutral restrictions are likely to embody a reasonable balance of
competing interests, and recommends, alternatively, that the Court
employ a mode of review which takes into account official tenden-
cies to be overprotective of regulatory interests. It also proposes
that a model for such scrutiny already exists in the methodology
devised by the Court to test for impermissible discrimination
against particular ideas.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONTINUUM OF SCRUTINY LEVELS IN
PUBLIC FORUM CASES
A. Heffron: The Paradigm of Low Level Scrutiny
A useful starting place in this inquiry is Heffron v. Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness,12 one of the Court's ful-
lest expositions of the time, place, and manner doctrine. In Hef-
fron, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness
(ISKCON), a Hindu religious sect commonly known as the Hari
Krishnas, sought to distribute and sell literature and solicit dona-
tions on the fairway at the 1977 Minnesota state fair. These activi-
ties were regarded by the Krishnas as an integral part of their reli-
gious practice.13 A Minnesota state fair regulation prohibited such
activities in all locations at the fair except at fixed booths which
could be rented from authorities on a first-come, first-served ba-
sis.14 The only peripatetic activity on the fairway which the regula-
tion was construed to permit was face-to-face proselytizing of fair-
goers by the Krishnas; no literature could be given away or sold,
12. 452 U.S. 640 (1981). Law review commentary on this case consists of Note, Heffron
v. ISKCON: The Tenuous Touchstone-A Step in the Wrong Direction? 19 Hous. L. REv.
325 (1982); Note, "Booth" Rule and State Fair Upheld a Valid Time, Place, and Manner
Restriction on Freedom of Expression, 12 Cum. L. REv. 693 (1982); Note, Continued Ero-
sion of a Fundamental Right, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 682 (1981); Note, Time, Place, and
Manner Regulations of Expressive Activities in the Public Forum, 61 NEB. L. REv. 167
(1982); Heifron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.: Reasonable Time,
Place, and Manner Restrictions, 15 J. MAR. L. REv. 543 (1982); Note, Heffron v. Interna-
tional Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.: A Restrictive Constitutional View of the
Proselytizing Rights of Religious Organizations, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 519 (1982).
13. 452 U.S. at 644-45. i
14. Id. at 644. The Court's opinion sets out the relevant portion of the state fair Rule
6.05 promulgated by the Minnesota Agricultural Society, a public corporation, in the follow-
ing terms: "[S]ale or distribution of any merchandise, including printed or written material
except under license issued [by] the Society and/or from a duly-licensed location shall be a




Prior to the opening of the fair, the Krishnas challenged the
constitutionality of the regulation by asserting that the regulation
violated rights guaranteed by the first amendment."" Minnesota of-
ficials asserted that the restriction was necessary; they argued,
among other things, that it protected against disruption of pedes-
trian traffic on the busy fairground.
17
In an opinion by Justice White, the Supreme Court upheld the
regulation and concluded that, on its face and as applied, it was an
appropriate exercise of state power. On an extremely sketchy re-
cord, Justice White concluded that the special function of a state
fair-a temporary event which attracts a very large number of peo-
ple each day-justified enforcement of the rule. "8 In reaching this
conclusion, he articulated a three-part test which incorporated the
policies articulated in prior public forum cases: "[1] that they are
justified without reference to the content of regulated speech, [2]
that they serve a significant governmental interest, and [3] that in
doing so they leave open ample alternative channels for communi-
cation of information."119 The rest of his opinion was devoted to
showing that the restriction on the Krishna activites passed muster
under the test.
Justice White's initial analytical step was to determine
whether the restriction was intended to be a tool of censorship.
The opinion concluded: "The Rule is not open to the kind of arbi-
trary application that this Court has condemned as inherently in-
consistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because
such discretion has the potential for becoming a means of sup-
pressing a particular point of view."20 Justice White also concluded
that the regulation was being construed in a nondiscriminatory
fashion because "[t]he method of allocating space is a straightfor-
ward first-come, first-served system."2
15. Id. at 643-44.
16. Id. at 644-45.
17. Id. at 645-46. The state raised other justifications for the restriction, including pro-
tection of the fair patrons against fraudulent solicitations, deceptive or false speech, undue
annoyance, and harrassment. The Court did not consider these assertions. Id. at 650 n.13.
18. Id. at 654.
19. Id. at 647-48 (quoting from Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
20. 452 U.S. at 649.
21. Id.
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The next step in the inquiry was to determine whether the
restriction was justified by a legitimate state interest unrelated to
speech. The large crowd attracted to the 125 acre fairground each
day was a factor sufficient to persuade the Court that "the State's
interest in the orderly movement and control of such an assembly
of persons is a substantial consideration. '22 Moreover, because the
site in question was a fairground, the Court explicitly refused to
apply legal principles applicable to regulation of public streets and
parks. Justice White maintained that the need for restrictions on a
fairground was greater than the need for restrictions on use of a
public street. "[A] street is continually open, often uncongested,
and constitutes not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of
a locality's citizens, but also a place where people may enjoy the
open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed
environment."2 3
Finally, the Court concluded that the restriction did not un-
necessarily constrict the flow of communications because it left
open alternative channels of communications with the intended
audience and thus did not totally isolate the Krishnas from fair
patrons: "[T]he Rule has not been shown to deny access within the
forum in question. Here, the Rule does not exclude ISKCON from
the fairgrounds, nor does it deny that organization the right to
conduct any desired activity at some point within the forum. "24
The Krishnas remained free to proselytize orally on the fair-
grounds. They also remained free to rent a booth as all exhibitors
had been required to do.2"
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court employed an ex-
tremely low level of scrutiny. The Court presumed that leafletting
and other such activities would inflict harm on state interests of
sufficient magnitude to justify the restriction. This presumption
was made even though the state put no evidence into the record
showing that the prohibited activities would actually have a tangi-
ble impact on the flow of people on the fairways.26 Since there was
no evidence of discrimination and because the restriction was not
unduly arbitrary or burdensome, the Court was satisfied that fair
22. Id. at 650.
23. Id. at 651.
24. Id. at 655.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 650.
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officials had made a sound administrative judgment.
Employment of a low level of scrutiny enabled the Heffron
Court to ignore the strong indication in the record that the restric-
tion on the leafletting might well have been unnecessary. This indi-
cation emerged from the state's choice to prohibit leafletting while
permitting face-to-face proselytizing. Justice Blackmun's concur-
ring and dissenting opinion was quick to point out the contradic-
tion inherent in such a choice:
The distribution of literature does not require that the recipient stop in order
to receive the message the speaker wishes to convey; instead, the recipient is
free to read the message at a later time. For this reason, literature distribu-
tion may present even fewer crowd control problems than the oral proselytiz-
ing that the State already allows upon the fairgrounds.
27
Yet, rather than carefully considering whether this problem re-
flected an arbitrary or discriminatory choice, the majority merely
assumed that the judgment of fairground administrators was a
trustworthy reconciliation of speech and regulatory interests.
Heffron was not written on a clean slate, however. As indi-
cated by the following discussion, review of the levels of judicial
scrutiny used in pre-Heffron public forum decisions shows that
Heffron is respresentative of the way the Court normally treats
public forum cases. A similarly low level of scrutiny has been used
in many prior decisions.
B. The Early Cases: Defining the Extremes of the Continuum
The policy of content-neutrality is the centerpiece of the juris-
prudence of public forums. It emerged as the centerpiece in a se-
ries of cases in the late 1930s and early 1940s. In those cases, the
Supreme Court assessed the facial validity of permit laws to see if
they contained standards sufficiently precise to discourage forum
regulators from arbitrarily denying permits.
1. The unconstitutionality of "standardless" regulation. In
Lovell v. City of Griffin,28 the Court overturned the conviction of a
Jehovah's Witness for leafletting without a permit because the ap-
plicable ordinance banned circulation of all literature within city
limits without a permit from the city manager.29 The ordinance
27. Id. at 665.
28. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
29. Id. at 447, 451.
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contained no concrete standards which specified when the granting
or denying of a permit would be appropriate.30 In a brief opinion,
the Supreme Court found that the absence of such standards in
the ordinance gave unlimited power to the city manager to grant or
deny permits whenever he wished: "There is thus no restriction in
its application with respect to time or place. It is not limited to
ways which might be regarded as inconsistent with the mainte-
nance of public order or as involving disorderly conduct, the mo-
lestation of the inhabitants or the misuse ... of the streets."'
1
A year later, in Hague v. CIO,32 the Court voided a public as-
sembly permit ordinance which the mayor of Jersey City used as
part of his broad scale efforts to disrupt union organizing activi-
ties.3 3 The ordinance was held unconstitutional because, as in
Lovell, it lacked specific standards to limit the exercise of official
discretion. Justice Roberts, writing for a plurality, explained that
the ordinance "does not make comfort or convenience in the use of
streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Direc-
tor of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such re-
fusal will prevent 'riots, disturbance or disorderly assemblage'.
'34
He explained that the vice of such a standardless law was its po-
tential use as an "instrument of arbitrary suppression of free ex-
pression of views on national affairs. .. .
Thus, the permit laws in Lovell and Hague were rejected for
lack of standards. This rejection evidenced the strength of the Su-
preme Court's distrust of discretionary decision making by public
officials in the context of forum regulation. In Lovell the Court was
so convinced that unconfined official discretion would lead to cen-
sorship that it did not allow enforcement of standardless licensing
provisions. This was done in spite of the fact that Alma Lovell had
not even attempted to apply for the required permit. Although the
30. Id. at 450-51.
31. Id. at 451. It should be noted that the words "or littering" were deleted from the
quotation and an ellipsis was inserted. The deletion was made to highlight the role of Lovell
as a case voiding laws that delegate unlimited discretion to regulators. Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 (1939), decided one year later, held that fear of littering was not a justification
for a ban on leafletting even if the statute or ordinance were clearly drawn. See infra text
accompanying notes 43-48.
32. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
33. Id. at 504-06.




Court might have confined itself to a holding that an unconstitu-
tional denial of a permit was the only valid defense to her prosecu-
tion, the Court chose instead to invalidate the ordinance on its
face. It apparently viewed the mere threat of censorship as suffi-
cient to preclude enforcement of a standardless law.
Similarly, in Hague the Supreme Court subjected the Jersey
City ordinance to a level of scrutiny which presumed that a
standardless ordinance would be used as a tool of censorship. Not-
withstanding provisions in the ordinance that authorized a permit
denial only if officials believed it necessary to prevent a riot, dis-
turbance, or disorderly assemblage,3 the Court demanded greater
specificity. It insisted on an ordinance which required that deter-
minations of the potential for riots or disturbances turn on objec-
tive facts rather than the subjective beliefs of the forum regulator.
It was unwilling to trust regulatory decisions which could not be
measured against objective standards as a check against censor-
ship.
The Court did not have to take such a speech-protective
stance. For example, it might have concluded that the ordinance
was valid because an administrator's indisputable familiarity with
the relevant facts about a particular demonstration put him in a
special position to make a reasoned judgment about any potential
for disorder that it presented. Instead, the Court presumed that
administrative reliance on the regulation's subjective decision-
making standards meant that public officials were going to unnec-
essarily impede the free flow of communication or exercise their
power discriminatorily. Thus, by automatically striking down such
standardless laws, the Court established a presumption that such
laws were tools of censorship.
2. The emergence of "content-neutral" regulation as a con-
stitutionally acceptable alternative. Even though the Court pre-
sumed censorship whenever reviewing standardless laws like those
in Lovell and Hague, the parameters of judicial review in public
forum cases were still far from clear. The Court had not yet affirm-
atively identified specific statutory language that it felt would pro-
vide sufficient protection against the threat of censorship and
would also accommodate competing regulatory interests. The
36. Id.
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Court took this important step in Cox v. New Hampshire.3 7
In Cox, several demonstrators had been prosecuted for parad-
ing without applying for a permit, in violation of the New Hamp-
shire permit statute. The defendants argued that the statute was
unconstitutional because it lacked adequate standards. The United
States Supreme Court disagreed. The statute was approved be-
cause its terms had been construed by the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court to require the granting of permits to demonstrators
subject only to "considerations of time, place, and manner so as to
conserve the public convenience."38 The Court explained that the
New Hampshire court's construction of its permit law established
a permit scheme that "provided authorities with notice in advance
[of a demonstration] so as to afford an opportunity for proper po-
licing, ' 39 yet "prescribed 'no measures for controlling or sup-
pressing the publication on highways, of facts and opinions, either
by speech or by writing'."
4 0
The crucial contribution of the Cox decision was its identifica-
tion of the terms "time," "place," and "manner" as the content-
neutral measures of the validity of a permit law.41 If those terms or
their analogues were present in the text of a law or were read into
it by judicial construction, Cox made clear that it would pass con-
stitutional muster. Beyond that, however, Cox did nothing to indi-
cate how the Court intended to apply the time, place, and manner
framework to specific factual contexts. Even though a conflict be-
tween content-neutral regulatory interests and competing speech
interests was virtually inevitable, Cox gave no guidance as to how
carefully the Court would scrutinize any particular time, place, or
manner restriction. Instead, it left regulators to their own devices
when enforcing content-neutral restrictions.
C. Completing the Continuum: Intermediate Variations in the
Levels of Scrutiny
A response to the deficiency in Cox was not long in coming. In
a series of decisions which began during the years just prior to
World War II and culminated with Heffron, the Court has sketch-
37. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
38. Id. at 575-76.
39. Id. at 576.
40. Id. at 575 (quoting from State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 16 A.2d 508, 514 (1940)).
41. See Kalven, supra note 1, at 25-27.
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ed its view of appropriate implementation of the time, place, and
manner doctrine. These cases demonstrate the Court's distinct
predisposition to employ lower levels of scrutiny when a forum re-
striction is not considered discriminatory and is not found to im-
pose a patently unreasonable burden on communication. 2 Such
tests are usually not difficult for forum regulators to meet. In these
cases the Court has usually been willing to accept unsupported of-
ficial claims of need for specific forum restrictions as trustworthy.
1. Streets and Parks. The earliest cases to indicate how con-
temporary public forum restrictions would be reviewed actually
predated Cox by a couple of years. The first indication had ap-
peared in Hague v. CIO.43 There, Justice Roberts articulated the
dictum that has become the keystone in the law of public forums.
In rejecting a government claim that streets and parks were the
equivalent of private property, he stated:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and lib-
erties of citizens. The privilege of, a citizen of the United States to use the
streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be
regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in
consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regula-
tion be abridged or denied.
4
Although the dictum employs property notions, it actually
stands for the proposition that communication in commonly acces-
sible places like thoroughfares, streets, and parks is simply an in-
terest too important to be completely prohibited. In articulating
this position, Justice Roberts gave notice to government officials
that the Court was not passively going to accept any justification
42. The Supreme Court, of course, evaluates forum restrictions against the three tests
articulated in Heffron. See supra text accompanying note 19. However, the Court appears to
determine whether those tests have been met by assessing the extent to which any depar-
ture from any one of the tests seems excessive. As suggested by the Court's inattention to
the ban on leafletting in Heffron, if noncompliance seems insubstantial, the Court is gener-
ally inclined to sustain the restriction without employing close scrutiny. See supra notes 12-
27 and accompanying text.
43. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
44. Id. at 515-16.
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for restricting speech. Instead, officials were put on notice that
there would be some cases in which the Court was going to make
its own assessment by weighing government claims against speech
interests.
A short time later the Court relied upon the Hague dictum to
rationalize its decision in Schneider v. State.45 The Schneider de-
cision invalidated city-wide bans on leafletting by refusing to pre-
sume that they were necessary to prevent littering. The Court
reached its conclusion in several steps. Initially, it accepted, with-
out serious examination, the government claim that litter control
was a legitimate governmental goal.46 More importantly, it fol-
lowed the thrust of the Hague dictum by stating that the streets
are "appropriate public places" for the dissemination of informa-
tion and opinion. Since streets and parks play a special role as
public forums, the Court concluded that a city-wide ban on leaflet-
ting was an unnecessarily restrictive way to protect the valid state
interest in avoiding littering:
We are of the opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good
appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person
rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive
it. Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for
the streets as an indirect consequence of such distribution results from the
constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and press. This constitu-
tional protection does not deprive a city of all power to prevent street litter-
ing. There are obvious methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is the
punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets.48
Schneider is instructive because of the level of scrutiny the
Court employed. While the level of scrutiny was less than that
used in the Lovell and Hague cases voiding laws that lacked clear
standards, the level seemed to be significantly more than no scru-
tiny at all. The Court found itself confronted with a total ban on
leafletting on public streets and parks, sites where a very substan-
tial portion of such activity could be reasonably expected to occur
if leafletteers sought to reach a sizable audience. If littering consid-
erations would support banning leafletting on such sites, then the
problem of littering could be used to justify a ban on leafletting at
45. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
46. Id. at 160-61.




virtually any site. Faced with such an obvious and extreme burden
on communications, the Court responded by employing a compara-
tively high level of scrutiny which avoided a presumption that all
content-neutral restrictions imposed on the use of streets for rou-
tine communication activities were valid. It treated that mere as-
sertion of need by the state as insufficient to sustain such a law. In
place of such an assertion, it appeared that the state would have to
actively persuade the Court that a more substantial interest than
littering was at stake-one of sufficient magnitude to justify denial
of access to a forum of great importance to protestors of all ideo-
logical stripes.
It should also be noted that the mode of scrutiny in Schneider
differed from that employed in cases such as Lovell, in which the
Court automatically voided statutes that lacked specific standards.
The Schneider Court did not reject all laws that amounted to
bans. Rather, it confined its rejection to flat bans on use of public
streets and parks. The possibility that flat bans would be upheld
on other sites if the state made an adequate showing of need was
left open by implication. This important implication was made
clear by the Court's acknowledgement that regulations banning
leafletting in intersections might well receive different treatment:
"[A] person could not exercise this liberty by taking his stand in
the middle of a crowded street, contrary to traffic regulations, and
maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic. . .. .-4 The level
of scrutiny in Schneider contrasted with that used in the standar-
dless discretion cases. In those cases, no justification put forward
by the state would ever be sufficient to persuade the Court to up-
hold an inadequately drafted statute.
2. Outside jails and state courthouses. The particular level
of scrutiny employed in Schneider has not been applied in subse-
quent cases reviewing bans on speech activities on sites other than
public streets. The Supreme Court has opted for either lower or
higher levels of scrutiny, depending on its view of the severity and
the content-neutral quality of the restriction before it. As will be
shown below, when the Court has reviewed restrictions imposed on
the use of public property which lacks the qualities of streets and
parks, the level of scrutiny has declined considerably. This is be-
cause, unlike the Schneider inquiry into the actual need for the
49. Id. at 160.
[Vol. 32
PUBLIC FORUM SPEECH REGULATION
flat ban as opposed to alternative restrictions, judicial review of
flat bans on access to certain sites for demonstrating has turned on
the presumption that, the regulated communication activities will
harm state interests. Inquiry has tended to stop at that point. No
inquiry into the presence of actual harm or the possibility of en-
forcing less restrictive means has followed.
For example, in Cox v. Louisiana [hereinafter "Cox H"]5 the
Supreme Court upheld a state statute banning picketing or pa-
rades in or near a state courthouse "with intent of interfering with
[the] administration of justice or [of] influencing any judge, juror,
witness or court officer. . .. ,,' On its face, the statute reached vir-
tually any demonstration the purpose of which was to express an
opinion about a pending proceeding, regardless of whether there
was an actual or threatened impact on that proceeding. 52 Although
the Court viewed the regulation as the equivalent of a flat ban on
all picketing near courthouses, it was still upheld. In doing so, the
Court employed an extremely low level of scrutiny in deciding the
case. The inquiry was largely confined to determining that the
statute protected a valid state interest.5 3 Upon concluding that the
interest was valid, the Court presumed that speech activities near
courthouses created such a threat of interference with judicial pro-
ceedings that a broad ban was appropriate. The Court approved
the regulation even though it extended to activities that might
have no direct impact on participants in particular proceedings:
"[A] State may protect against the possibility of a conclusion by
the public ... that the judge's action was in part a product of
intimidation and did not flow only from the fair and orderly work-
ing of the judicial process.
'54
A year later in Adderly v. Florida,5 the Court employed a
similarly low level of scrutiny. The Court upheld the trespass con-
victions of protestors for assembling on the grounds outside a jail.
The convictions arose out of a protest against the previous arrests
of failed student demonstrators. The sheriff in charge of the jail
50. 379 U.S. 559 (1965). Commentators generally refer to this case as "Cox IP' to dis-
tinguish it from Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, a case which was decided on the same day
as Cox II, and which arose from the same factual setting.
51. 379 U.S. at 560, 564.
52. Id. at 564.
53. Id. at 561-64.
54. Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
55. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
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ordered the protestors to leave. When they refused, they were ar-
rested and convicted for trefpass.5 6 The low level of the Court's
scrutiny is clear because the judicial inquiry was primarily con-
fined to determining whether the sheriff's decision had been an ef-
fort to discriminate against the views of the demonstrators. Find-
ing no discrimination present, the Court assumed that because of
the specialized purposes of jail facilities, the state had a sufficient
interest in jail administration to justify the exclusion of all demon-
strations from the grounds. This assumption, while not clearly ar-
ticulated in the opinion, was revealed in the Court's observation
that "[t]he State, no less than a private owner of property has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to
which it is lawfully dedicated.
'57
The low level of review employed both in Cox II and in Ad-
derly appears to have been the product of two considerations.
First, the Court was convinced that neither restriction created the
potential for officially authorized censorship because neither was
inherently discriminatory and both were even-handed efforts to
protect the operations of state institutions. Second, the Court was
apparently persuaded that state courthouse and jailhouse grounds
were such atypical places for demonstrations that a flat ban on
demonstrations at such sites would not significantly interfere with
demonstrator access to their audiences. Demonstrators still had fo-
rums such as streets and parks available to them.55 Moreover, in
the absence of evidence of intent to censor, there appeared to be
no suspicious regulatory motives. As a consequence, the Court
56. Id. at 44-46.
57. Id. at 47.
58. Another example of the Court's relatively consistent emphasis on protecting speech
in forums that it regards as traditional sites for protest appears in Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). There the Court overturned breach of peace convictions because
protestors peaceably assembled at the South Carolina State House grounds-a location the
Court viewed as a proper place for protests:
It has long been established that these First Amendment freedoms are pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States (citations
omitted). The circumstances in this case reflect an exercise of these basic consti-
tutional rights in their most pristine and classic form. The petitioners felt ag-
grieved by laws of South Carolina which allegedly "prohibited Negro privileges
in this State." They peaceably assembled at the site of the State Government
and there peaceably expressed their grievances to the citizens of South Carolina,
along with the Legislative Bodies of South Carolina.
Id. at 235.
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readily assumed that each restriction represented a sound balance
between speech interests and regulatory interests.
3. Public schools. If the scrutiny used in the cases reviewing
restrictions on demonstrations near jails and state courthouses was
low, it took a sharp jump upward in a case reviewing restrictions
on student speech in public schools. In Tinker v. Des Moines Inde-
pendent Community School District,59 the Supreme Court over-
turned a decision to suspend students for wearing armbands at
school as a symbolic protest against the war in Vietnam. The sus-
pensions had been imposed by school officials who feared that dis-
play of the antiwar armbands would provoke trouble among other
students.6 0 The Supreme Court voided the suspensions because an-
tiwar ideas had been singled out by school officials who failed to
produce palpable evidence to support their fear of disruption. 1
The Tinker Court reached its holding in two steps. First, it
concluded that in spite of the school officials' need for comprehen-
sive authority "to prescribe and control conduct,"62 schools were a
proper place for communication of ideas.6 3 Second, the Court con-
cluded that school officials could not regulate school premises as
though they were private property subject to the unrestrained dis-
cretion of administrators: "[A school] is a public place, and its ded-
ication to specific uses does not imply that the constitutional rights
of persons entitled to be there are to be gauged as if the premises
were purely private property."
64
Having taken these steps, the Court proceeded to employ a
comparatively high level of judicial scrutiny. The Court imposed a
59. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
60. Id. at 508, 510.
61. Id. at 511.
62. Id. at 507.
63. The Court was quite emphatic about this point, stating:
The principal use to which the schools are dedictated is to accommodate stu-
dents during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities.
Among these activities is personal intercommunication among students. This is
not only an inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an impor-
tant part of the educational process.
Id. at 512.
64. Id. at 509. The Court seemed to abandon private property notions in public forum
cases via the dictum in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514-16 (1938) and the rationale in
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943), which voided bans on leafletting in public streets
because private property law was inappropriate. The Court's preoccupation with private
property concepts reemerges periodically; see, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
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significant burden of justification on school administrators to
demonstrate that the restrictions on particular communications
could be supported by objective evidence. The standard was speci-
fied in the following terms:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibi-
tion of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its
action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discom-
fort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Cer-
tainly where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbid-
den conduct would "materially and substantially interfere with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the
prohibition cannot be sustained."s
The level of scrutiny in Tinker presented a sharp contrast to
that used in the courthouse and jail curtilage cases.6 Instead of
assuming that the restriction was needed and that harm would oc-
cur to school activities in its absence, the Court did precisely the
opposite. It presumed that the restrictions inflicted unnecessary
harm on communications activities and placed a burden on the
state to prove otherwise.
The comparatively high level of scrutiny in Tinker seems to be
explained by the Court's conclusion that the restriction banned
communication of a single idea. The Supreme Court was thus con-
fronted with a restriction that had the earmark of censorship and,
therefore, declined to presume that the restriction struck a sound
balance between speech and regulatory interests. Instead, school
administrators would have to prove they were exercising sound
judgment:
[A] particular symbol-black armbands worn to exhibit opposition to this
Nation's involvement in Vietnam-was singled out for prohibition. Clearly,
the prohibition of expression of one particular opinion, at least without evi-
dence that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with
schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.
67
A distinctive feature of Tinker was the particular character of
the presumption it created. The presumption against the validity
of the state regulation was more limited than that which had been
applied to review of statutes lacking clear standards; yet it was
65. 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)).
66. See supra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
67. 393 U.S. at 510-11.
[Vol. 32
1983] PUBLIC FORUM SPEECH REGULATION
more rigorous than the Schneider balancing standard. s In the
standardless discretion cases, the Court had presumed that speech
opportunities were unduly threatened.69 In Schneider, the Court
assessed a precisely drawn restriction by balancing the expected
impact of the restriction, and even discussed a less restrictive al-
ternative that might be substituted. 0 In contrast to both, Tinker
employed a presumption of unconstitutionality which could only
be rebutted by an actual showing that the communication would
inflict harm on a valid state interest. 1 While the Court made clear
that school officials could restrict speech where necessary, they
could only do so if they could actually show that the restriction
was necessary to avoid disruption of the educational process.7
4. Military installations. In the years following Tinker, the
Court decided Flower v. United States13 and Greer v. Spock.
7 4
Both decisions governed speech activities by private citizens on
military installations. At first glance these cases seem to employ
very different levels of scrutiny. Flower appears to presume that
the state justifications were suspect; Spock appears to presume
that the state justifications were valid. Upon closer examination,
68. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
70. 308 U.S. at 162. The Court suggested punishing litterers as an alternative.
71. The obvious parallel to the Court's approach to deciding Tinker is the "clear and
present danger" test in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Like Brandenburg,
Tinker permits regulation of the content of communiction when the purpose of the regula-
tion is to prevent speech from creating a tangible physical interference or harm. The regula-
tion is found constitutional because the harm it is supposed to prevent is the actual disrup-
tion of the operation of state institutions. The Court apparently does not regard this as
censorship because the focus of the regulation is on preventing the harm rather than
preventing the communication. The restriction on speech is theoretically incidental to
avoidance of the harm.
72. In Board of Educ. v. PICO, 452 U.S. 853 (1982), the Court appears to have left the
Tinker approach intact in a school setting. There a majority of the Court held that the
decision of school board members to remove books from the school library that they found
"objectionable" and "improper fare for students" was subject to judicial review. Id. at 871-
72. The Court concluded that book removal could be sustained only if the trial record
showed that school officials did not remove the books because of disagreement with consitu-
tionally protected ideas in those books. Id. However, the Court's commitment to Tinker is
clouded by the fact that Justice White, who provided the fifth and deciding vote, concurred
purely on the question of whether the evidence was sufficient to support a summary judg-
ment. He explicitly refused to address the first amendment question. Id. at 883-84 (White,
J., concurring).
73. 407 U.S. 197 (1972).
74. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
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however, one can see that both cases were decided using essentially
the approach that had begun to emerge in prior public forum
cases. The superficially different levels of scrutiny reflected factual
distinctions between the two cases. These factual differences led
the Court to treat one case as involving speech in public streets
and the other case as involving speech on the interior of a military
base, which the Court concluded was very different from a public
forum.
In Flower v. United States the Supreme Court overturned a
conviction of a Quaker for distributing antiwar leaflets on a gov-
ernment-owned street running through the Fort Sam Houston Mil-
itary Base."' The Army contended that leafletting on a military
base could be prohibited at the discretion of the base commander
as an incident of the administrative needs of a military base. In a
per curiam opinion, the Court summarily rejected this contention.
A review of the facts in the trial record showed that the street in
question was open to and routinely used by the general public as a
public street.76 The Court concluded that the street in the military
base was the equivalent of any other public street, and leafletting
was, therefore, entitled to the same constitutional safeguards that
it received on other public streets.7
In Greer v. Spock, the Court went to great lengths to confine
the Flower decision to its facts. There it upheld a ban on partisan
political speechmaking and demonstrating on sites inside the Fort
Dix Military Reservation, and a ban on distribution of literature
without prior approval of the commanding general. Central to the
Court's reasoning was its conclusion that the restriction on parti-
san speech was directed at protecting state interests unrelated to
the viewpoint of the communication and, therefore, affected all
partisan communication identically, regardless of the identity of
the political party or the candidate. 8 In the Court's words, the ban
on speeches and demonstrations was "a considered Fort Dix policy,
objectively and evenhandedly applied, of keeping official military
activities there wholly free of entanglement with partisan political
campaigns of any kind.
'70
75. 407 U.S. at 198.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 198-99.
78. 424 U.S. at 838-39.
79. 424 U.S. at 839.
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The military restriction on leafletting received similar treat-
ment.80 Because the restriction was specifically drafted to prohibit
communications which would have harmful effects on the opera-
tion of the military, the Court concluded that it was confined to
protecting regulatory interests unrelated to content:
[The regulation] does not authorize Fort Dix authorities to prohibit the dis-
tribution of conventional political campaign literature. The only publications
that a military commander may disapprove are those he finds constitute "a
clear danger to [military] loyalty, discipline or morale," and he "may not pre-
vent distribution of a publication simply because he does not like its con-
tents," or because it "is critical-even unfairly critical-of government poli-
cies or officials. . -8
The Court in Flower and Spock focused its analysis on two
factors: the lack of discrimination and the degree of similarity of
each location to a public street. The focus on these factors made
the contrasting levels of review consistent with the Court's ap-
proach to judicial review in prior public forum cases. In Flower the
Court rested its ruling on the fact that the street on the military
base was indistinguishable from any other public street.8 2 Thus,
the Flower majority treated the case as merely another ban on
leafletting on public streets. Under such circumstances it was pre-
dictable that the Court would employ a level of scrutiny commen-
surate with that employed in reviewing the flat ban on leafletting
in Schneider. Since a public street is generally regarded as one of
the most traditional and'important forums, the fact that the street
passed through a military base was found to be an insufficient
ground to justify overriding speech interests.
Spock presented a different kind of case. There the speakers
sought access to a much less traditional site-the interior of a mili-
tary base. The Court viewed this site as quite distinct from a pub-
lic street or a park, observing thaft"[ilt is . . . the business of a
military installation like Fort Dix to train soldiers, not to provide a
80. The military regulation at issue in Greer v. Spock stated that permission to dis-
tribute a publication could be withheld only where "it appears that the dissemination of
[the] publication presents a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops at
[the] installation ... ." Army Reg. 210-10, % 5-5(c)(1970), as cited in Greer v. Spock, 424
U.S. at 831 n.2.
81. 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (quoting Dept. of the Army, Guidance on Dissent §§
5(a)(1), 5(a)(3) (June 23, 1969)).
82. 407 U.S. at 198.
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public forum. ' 83 In addition, because the literature distribution re-
striction also before the Court was limited to protecting against
potential interference with the administration of the military, the
Court treated the regulation as an effort to protect against a harm
to military operations rather than as an effort to regulate content.
The Spock Court employed the lowest level of scrutiny that
could be used in reviewing a governmental restriction on communi-
cation activities. The regulations were presumed to be necessary to
protect against harm to the state interests identified by the mili-
tary administrators. As in the courthouse and jail grounds cases,
the Court required no evidence that the speech activities in ques-
tion would actually inflict harm. In fact, the scrutiny was even
lower than in those cases because the Spock Court presumed the
need for imposing restrictions despite the fact that the "non-parti-
san" restrictions excluded entire categories of speech. 4
The comparative ease with which the Spock Court selected
the exceedingly low level of scrutiny ultimately employed is never
fully explained in its short, rhetorical opinion. Aside from distin-
guishing the interior of a military base from a public street, the
Court's opinion does little more than invoke platitudes about the
traditional function of a military base and the importance of a po-
litically neutral military. 5 However, in so doing it implies an ele-
ment that, although not mentioned, may have influenced the out-
come of the case: the Court's singular lack of expertise concerning
the administration of the military. A decision to void the restric-
tions at issue in the case would have substituted the views of
judges for those of military administrators. Absent a clear indica-
tion of censorship, the majority of the Court may not have been
willing to second-guess the administrative decisions which led to
the promulgation of the regulations." This deference to adminis-
trative decisions is an element which was made clearer in a trio of
prison cases.
5. Inside prisons. During the mid-1970s, the Supreme
Court handed down three important cases addressing the validity
83. 424 U.S. at 838.
84. See supra note 80.
85. 424 U.S. at 837-38.
86. For a similar view of the military installation cases see Brest, The Supreme Court,
1975 Term, Foreward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1,
156 (1976).
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of restrictions on communications inside prisons.87 These cases
highlight the relation of the level of judicial scrutiny to the observ-
able potential for censorship or oppressive restrictions and the pre-
sumed reliability of non-discriminatory decision making. In decid-
ing these cases, the Supreme Court employed divergent levels of
scrutiny in a fashion parallel to that in the military cases. This
time, however, the Court was more articulate about its reasons.
The most active scrutiny was reserved for review of a restriction on
inmate correspondence that lacked clear, content-neutral stan-
dards. In two other cases, the Court employed minimal levels of
scrutiny in assessing restrictions on communications framed to
preserve prison discipline. In fact, scrutiny was so low in these lat-
ter cases, that it approached a standard of no scrutiny at all.
The first case in which the court assessed the validity of re-
strictions on communication in a prison setting was Procunier v.
Martinez.8 In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court in-
validated prison regulations which prohibited inmates from send-
ing letters that "unduly complain," "magnify grievances," or ex-
press "inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or
beliefs." '89 In so doing, the Court invoked the high level of scrutiny
that it routinely had applied to provisions lacking sufficiently clear
standards to prevent the use of administrative power to engage in
censorship. The reason was obvious: "These regulations fairly in-
vited prison officials and employees to apply their own personal
prejudices and opinions as standards for mail censorship."90
Justice Powell was quite careful, however, to point out that
the high standard of scrutiny the Court was applying to the mail
regulations would not be applied to prison restrictions more di-
rectly related to safeguarding prison discipline. In dictum, he made
clear that the Court viewed prison administrators' discretion as so
worthy of enormous deference that a powerful presumption pro-
tecting that discretion existed: "[P]rison administrators may [not]
87. See infra, notes 93, 97, 101 and accompanying text.
88. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
89. Id. at 399-400. In portions of the opinion not treated by this Article, the Court
invalidated a ban against the practice of law students and legal paraprofessionals con-
ducting interviews of inmates on behalf of the inmates' attorneys. The Court rested this
ruling on "the requirement that prisoners be afforded access to the courts in order to chal-
lenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of their consitutional rights."
Id. at 419.
90. Id. at 415.
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be required to show with certainty that adverse consequences
would flow from the failure to censor a particular letter. Some lati-
tude in anticipating the probable consequences of allowing certain
speech in a prison environment is essential to the proper discharge
of an administrator's duty."91
One year later, in Pell v. Procunier,92 Justice Powell's dictum
became the basis for decision. In Pell the Court upheld a prison
regulation banning reporters from conducting inmate interviews in
California prisons. The ban was found to be appropriate for two
reasons. First, in the Court's view, prisons were not the equivalent
of public forums.9 3 Second, the opinion stated that the special
character of prisons obliged the judiciary to presume the reliability
of decision making by prison officials. 4 A narrow exception to this
presumption arose when a challenger to a regulation could produce
substantial proof that it was unnecessary. "[S]ecurity considera-
tions are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise
of corrections officials, and, in the absence of s2ubstantial evidence
in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their
response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to
their expert judgment in such matters." 95
The broad dimensions of the Court's inclination to presume
that prison administrators' judgments are reliable was reempha-
sized a few years later in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners
Union.96 There the Court upheld regulations banning meetings,
bulk mailings, and membership solicitations made in the course of
efforts to organize a prisoners' union. The Court addressed the
case in the same fashion it had addressed Pell. A need was pre-
sumed for the regulation without putting any burden on the state
to show that prison operations would be harmed in its absence.
The strength of the Court's presumption was indicated when
it articulated the rationale for its decision to uphold the regula-
tions as "appropriate deference to the decisions of prison adminis-
trators. 97 It is noteworthy that the regulations were specifically
91. Id. at 414.
92. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
93. Id. at 826-27.
94. Id. at 827.
95. Id.
96. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
97. Id. at 125.
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directed at restricting the contents of prisoner communica-
tion-the dissemination of communications relating to formation
of an inmate union. 8 This presented a contrast with the Tinker
Court's approval of armbands which was accompanied by a rejec-
tion of regulations directed at prohibiting a specific idea., Here
the Court recognized that restrictions on communications about a
prisoners' union constituted- content discrimination and nonethe-
less approved the restriction. Moreover, the Court required no jus-
tification other than the fact that prison officials had determined
the content restrictions to be necessary:
First Amendment agsociational rights, while perhaps more directly implicated
by the regulatory prohibitions, likewise must give way to the reasonable con-
siderations of penal management. As already noted, numerous associational
rights are necessarily curtailed by the realities of confinement. They may be
curtailed whenever the institution's officials, in the exercise of their informed
discretion, reasonably conclude that such associations, whether through
group meetings or otherwise, possess the likelihood of disruption to prison
order or stability, or otherwise interfere with the legitimate penological objec-
tives of the prison environment. As we noted in Pell v. Procunier,. . . "cen-
tral to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal
security within the corrections facilities themselves."'00
The reasons for the high level of scrutiny of the standardless
mail regulation in Martinez, the first of the prison censorship
cases, is quite clear. The situation was a familiar one for the Court.
The regulation lacked specifically articulated limits on official dis-
cretion capable of preventing censorship of inmate mail by zealous
prison officials. The presumption of invalidity so readily applied to
standardless restrictions 01 was thus carried into the context of
prison mail censorship. The Court could see no justification for
making an exception to the established doctrine that vesting
standardless discretion in an official with power to censor particu-
lar documents was potentially too damaging to the flow of commu-
nication to be permitted.10 2 Moreover, if the state interest was sig-
nificant enough, clearly drafted regulatory standards could still be
formulated to protect state interests without encouraging
censorship.
98. Id. at 131-32.
99. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
100. 433 U.S. at 132 (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 823).
101. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
102. 416 U.S. at 407-14.
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The reasons for the low level of scrutiny in Pell and Jones,
cases which involved, respectively, regulations governing press in-
terviews, and regulations restricting the formation of a prisoners'
union, are twofold: First, the Supreme Court concluded that a
prison-a closed institution-was not a public forum akin to
streets and parks and, therefore, was not subject to all of the con-
stitutional doctrines governing such sites.10 3 Second, and much
more importantly, where prison discipline and administration were
involved, the Court was not nearly as willing to substitute its judg-
ment for that of prison officials.'" In fact, the Court was so wary of
involving itself in the tough and unpredictable realm of prison ad-
ministration that in the absence of evidence of invidious motives,
it was prepared to assume the necessity for selectively regulating
the content of specified communications, regardless of the fact that
such regulation seemed as close to censorship as the ban on anti-
war armbands in Tinker.105
6. Teachers' mailboxes. During the 1982 term, the Court
handed down a decision which again demonstrated its strong incli-
nations to defer to administrators' judgments. In Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,'"s it sustained
the validity of provisions of a collective bargaining agreement be-
tween a school board and a public employees' union which gave the
union exclusive access to teacher mailboxes at the district's
schools.10 7 The agreement had been challenged by a rival, unrecog-
103. 433 U.S. at 134.
104. 417 U.S. at 827.
105. The Court has repeatedly shown its inclination to reduce the level of scrutiny ordi-
narily used in reviewing standardless regulations governing the substance of communica-
tions in special settings where regulators have special administrative expertise. The Court is
uneasy about voiding restrictions which grant broad discretion to regulators who must oper-
ate complex and volatile institutions. In Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980), the Court
upheld a military prohibition against circulating petitions among military personnel to
gather signatures for Congress. "While members of the military services are entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment, 'the different character of the military community and
the military mission requires a different application of those protections.'" Id. at 354 (quot-
ing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974)). "Because the right to command and the duty
to obey must be unquestioned, this Court long ago recognized that the military must possess
substantial discretion over its internal discipline." Brown, 444 U.S. at 357. Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977), applied a similarly permissive approach to
review content regulations in the prison setting.
106. 103 S.Ct. 948 (1983).
107. A previous case, United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S.
114 (1981), addressed the question of whether residential mailboxes were public forums for
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nized union on grounds that it cut the rival off from access to the
teachers via the important route of school mailboxes. The rival
union unsuccessfully contended that it was the victim of discrimi-
nation because the mailboxes were a public forum and because the
recognized union and groups like the local cub scouts had been
given access to the boxes.
Although the majority opinion by Justice White focused on
analysis which concluded that teachers' mailboxes were not a pub-
lic forum, deference to the judgment of officials concerned with the
complex problems of labor relations seemed to be central to the
outcome. In Justice White's words: "We have previously noted that
the 'designation of a union as exclusive representative carries with
it great responsibilities. The tasks of negotiating and administering
a collective bargaining agreement and representing the interests of
employees in settling disputes and processing grievances are con-
tinuing and difficult ones.',8 Although he did not say so explic-
itly, he rather clearly implied that the majority felt it lacked the
ability to make judgments which were superior to those of the par-
ticipants to the labor contract and therefore preferred not to sub-
ject the contested provision of the contract to a high level of
scrutiny.
In fact, the extraordinarily low level of scrutiny was high-
lighted by the Court's unquestioning acceptance of the school
board's claim that exclusion of the rival union was necessary "to
prevent the District's schools from becoming a battlefield for inter-
union squabbles." 10 9 There was contrary evidence in the record
which was largely ignored. The Court's refusal to consider evidence
addressed to the question of whether the restriction was really nec-
essary was treated in a single, conclusory statement relegated to a
footnote: "We have not required that such proof be present to jus-
tify the denial of access to a non-public forum on grounds that the
purposes of distribution of unstamped leaflets and circulars. The Court held that they were
not. The procedural peculiarities of that litigation preclude an identification of the level of
scrutiny employed by the Court. It reviewed the case after a trial on the merits during
which substantial evidence to support the exclusion of unstamped material from mailboxes
was introduced by the government.
108. 103 S.Ct. at 958-59 (quoting from Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 221
(1977)).
109. 103 S.Ct. at 948, 959 (quoting from Haukvedahl v. School District No. 108, No.
75c-3641 (N.D. Ill. 1976)).
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proposed use may disrupt the property's intended function." 110
D. Integrating the Cases into a Continuum: A Judicial Prefer-
ence for Lower Levels of Scrutiny
The previous discussion indicates that the level of scrutiny in
public forum cases varies according to the characteristics of each
case. 11 If, from a perusal of the circumstances of a particular case,
110. 103 S.Ct. at 959 n.12.
111. Perry Educ. Ass'n. stated that there are three categories of forums:
In places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate, the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are
sharply circumscribed. At one end of the spectrum are streets and parks which
"have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions." In these quintessential public
forums, the government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the
state to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end. The state may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and
manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.
A second category consists of public property which the state has opened for
use by the public as a place for expressive activity. The Constitution forbids a
state to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public
even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place. Although a state
is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as
it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public
forum. Reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permissible, and a
content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling
state interest.
Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication is governed by different standards. We have recognized that the
"First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is
owned or controlled by the government." In addition to time, place, and manner
regulations, the state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, commu-
nicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view. As we have stated on several occasions, "the State, no less than a
private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control
for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated."
103 S.Ct. at 954-55 (citations omitted).
The Court's identification of these categories of forums suggest that there are only three
discrete levels of judicial scrutiny. However, this is somewhat misleading. There is nothing
inherent in the categories to indicate when one site will be treated differently from another.
Under the categories, regulators can exclude a particular speech activity from designated
forums when the activity is inconsistent with the forum's primary function, just as they can
exclude speakers from nonpublic forums whose activities are inconsistent with its intended
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the Supreme Court concludes that officials might be acting as cen-
sors because of official distaste for the ideas communicated, the
level of scrutiny is quite high. If the circumstances indicate a mini-
mal likelihood that the regulator is acting like a censor and if there
are indications he or she is attempting to discharge purely regula-
tory functions, then the level of scrutiny is much lower. Judicial
scrutiny all but disappears when the Court concludes that there
are limited indications of censorship and the administrator is an
expert who is regulating a closed institution with volatile or ex-
tremely complex administrative problems.
Thus, in the review of standardless permit laws, the Court has
presumed that such discretion would be applied to censor ideas.
Using the high level of scrutiny implicit insuch a presumption, the
Court has routinely invalidated such laws. Similarly, when public
officials have attempted to exclude specific ideas from discourse in
a setting where discourse is to be expected, the Court has shown a
high degree of distrust of official justifications by presuming them
insufficient unless supported by some indication of actual harm to
state interests. Thus, in Tinker, when public officials sought specif-
ically to exclude antiwar ideas from the schools, the Court imposed
a level of scrutiny that required evidentiary support of official jus-
tifications.112 When the restriction has amounted to a flat ban on
access to commonly used forums like streets and parks, the burden
on speech has been viewed as sufficient to require judicial inquiry
into whether official justifications and decisions were trustworthy
or whether less intrusive alternatives were available.
113
In typical cases upholding forum restrictions, judicial scrutiny
has usually remained at minimal levels. Those cases have generally
been characterized by non-discriminatory, content-neutral restric-
tions which are not so broad as to isolate totally the speaker from
his audience. In such cases, the Court has presumed the necessity
of the restrictions without proof of need from the state. Thus in
Adderly v. Florida,"4 the Court upheld the sheriff's decision to ex-
function. Id. at 955 & n.7. Therefore, the only way to ascertain the differences in the judici-
ary's treatment of the official decisions governing each site is to determine from the charac-
ter of the forum whether the Court is likely to view its own judgment or that of the forum
regulator as more trustworthy.
112. See supra text accompanying note 65.
113. See supra text accompanying note 48.
114. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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elude demonstrations from grounds adjacent to a jail because there
was no suggestion of censorship. The Court apparently felt it could
trust the reliability of the sheriff's decision because he appeared to
have no motive to act arbitrarily. Similarly, in Cox 1115 the Court
upheld a ban on courthouse demonstrations and accepted the leg-
islative judgment that all demonstrations near courthouses were
harmful to judicial proceedings. This was undoubtedly because
nothing in the facts indicated that the legislative judgment was not
to be trusted.
The judiciary's willingness to presume the trustworthiness or
reliability of official decision making renders Heffron far more un-
derstandable. The upholding of restrictions on Krishna leafletting,
literature sales, and fund solicitations, without evidence to show
that these activities would disrupt competing state interests, is
characteristic of the Supreme Court's prior treatment of content-
neutral restrictions. The restriction on the Krishnas' activities was
non-discriminatory. The restriction was enforced for a purpose un-
related to content. Because alternative means of communication
remained, the Court was satisfied that it was not tantamount to a
flat ban.
The Court's willingness to employ such a low level of scrutiny
appears to rest on the majority's view that the restriction in ques-
tion was the product of an inherently trustworthy administrative
decision. Apparently the Court felt that because the restriction was
not based on the content or subject matter of Krishna speech and
since it facilitated crowd control without completely excluding the
Krishnas from the fairgrounds, it could be assumed that the regu-
lators had struck a sound balance between competing interests.
This is precisely the assumption that appears to have been made
in previously decided public forum cases employing a low level of
scrutiny.
The majority's assumption seems arbitrary because the record
clearly suggested that the restriction was broader than necessary.
It prevented leafletting while allowing proselytizing, which ap-
peared to have the same or greater capacity to hinder the flow of
pedestrians. The overreach of the restriction was rather graphically
illustrated by Justice Brennan's characterization of the dilemma
confronting the Krishnas:
115. See supra note 50.
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All share the identical right to move peripatetically and speak freely through
the fairgrounds.
Because of Rule 6.05, however, as soon as a proselytizing member of ISK-
CON hands out a free copy of the Bhagavad-Gita to an interested listener, or
a political candidate distributes his campaign brochure to a potential voter,
he becomes subject to arrest and removal from the fairgrounds.116
The constitutional significance of this overreach is under-
scored by the fact that the leafletting prohibited by fair officials
has traditionally been a mode of communication accorded special
treatment by the Court. In Schneider, the Court had rejected a flat
ban on leafletting in public streets and parks, characterizing pam-
phlets as historic weapons in the defense of liberty.117 In Martin v.
Struthers,"1s the Court had voided a prohibition against ringing
doorbells to deliver leaflets because "[d]oor to door distribution of
circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little peo-
ple." 119 It could be argued that the Heffron Court's prohibition of
leafletting and simultaneous expression of tolerance for proselytiz-
ing was justified. Indeed, enforcement of a ban on proselytizing
might have been seen by fair officials as too costly and annoying to
fairgoers because it would have required policing of individual con-
versations. However, the record's silence on the subject suggests
that such a justification did not come easily enough to the state for
its inclusion as part of the state's case in the trial court. Thus, it
seems fair to surmise that the state found the inconsistency as dif-
ficult to justify as the concurring and dissenting justices did.
The apparent inconsistency in banning a leafletting while al-
lowing oral proselytizing could also be seen as comparatively unim-
portant. It could be viewed as a solitary instance in which the mis-
taken presumption was made that a particular restriction was
necessary. However, closer examination suggests that the apparent
inconsistency in Heffron is probably a product of a more system-
atic phenomenon. The inconsistency appears to be a consequence
of the Court's routine employment of a low level of scrutiny in re-
view of most content-neutral forum restrictions. Such scrutiny has
the consequence of freeing forum regulators to formulate and en-
116. Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 659-60
(1981) (Brennan, J. concurring and dissenting).
117. 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
118. 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
119. Id. at 146.
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force a broad range of potentially unnecessary restrictions without
fear of significant judicial review.
Underlying the low level of scrutiny applied to the typical
time, place, and manner cases, then, is the judicial assumption
that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, official regulatory
decisions are inherently trustworthy. They are assumed to be
sound accommodations of the conflict between speech interests
and regulatory interests.1 0 This assumption is examined in the
concluding sections of this Article. These sections examine the ac-
tual incentives governing official decision making. The analysis
demonstrates that the Court makes an important error when it as-
sumes that forum regulators make rational, balanced decisions in
all cases except those in which discrimination is evident, or a flat
ban is imposed.
II. ERRONEOUS BEHAVIORIAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE
LOWER LEVELS OF SCRUTINY IN PUBLIC FORUM CASES
Central to the time, place, and manner doctrine is the Su-
preme Court's desire to neutralize incentives that regulators have
to censor communication because of their disapproval of its con-
tent.121 At the same time, the Court has recognized the necessity
for content-neutral restrictions that preserve essential functioning
of the conventional public services and activities of citizens that
can be disrupted by communication activities in public places. By
employing lower levels of scrutiny in so many public forum cases,
the Court has reached its outcome in those cases by assuming that
regulatory decision making is trustworthy most of the time. Unfor-
tunately, in making this assumption, the Court has failed to recog-
nize the high frequency of circumstances in which public officials
have strong incentives to overregulate, even though they intend no
censorship and though no actual interference with public services
or activities is present or imminent. These incentives appear in
cases in which there is an undifferentiated apprehension that
120. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934): "With the wisdom of the
[economic] policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward
it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal." For an insight into judicial
decision making as a product of the judicial assessment of the comparative skills of various
institutional decisionmakers, see Komesar, In Search of General Approach of Legal Analy-
sis: A Comparative Institutional Alternative, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1350, 1383-90 (1981).
121. See supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
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speech activities have the potential to generate significant law en-
forcement problems and high administrative expenses.
The incentive of regulators to impose unnecessary content-
neutral restrictions probably comes from two sources. First, there
is the tendency of forum regulators to be disproportionately sensi-
tive to threats of disruptions of public services and routine activi-
ties of the citizenry. Second, forum regulators tend to be particu-
larly sensitive toward protecting public services and routine
activities of the citizenry when the communication is controversial
or is of interest to only a small segment of the population.
A. Disproportionate Sensitivity to Regulatory Interests
The tangible pressures on public officials to be attentive to the
protection of state regulatory concerns, such as maintenance of or-
der, protection of traffic flow, and protection of public services are
quite strong.122 Failure to pay adequate attention to such regula-
tory needs can result in immediate disruptions of routine commu-
nity activities. There is even a risk of severe disorder. For example,
a public assembly in the middle of a major downtown intersection
during rush hour has an immediate and tangible, if not cata-
strophic, impact on automobile traffic. Similarly, two parades at
the same time and in the same place will generate confusion with
unpredictable and potentially dangerous consequences. The possi-
bility of such easily observable and dramatic occurrences inevita-
bly produces powerful incentives for officials to exercise great care.
Administrators are vulnerable to strong criticism and may even
face discharge if their regulatory efforts are insufficient.
122. This observation is based both on analysis and the observations of the author,
who, during the course of public forum litigation, has had occasion to question public offi-
cials about their regulatory decisions. See, e.g., Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746
(7th Cir. 1972), and Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). See also Jaffee, The
Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1183 (1973), in which the author
contends that, when there is broad administrative discretion, administrative decisions are
determined by several elements, including:
[T]he intensity of a given problem, the degree to which it is felt throughout an
organized and stable constituency, and the representation (or lack thereof) of
varying interests within and without the lawmaking body. The significance of
each of these elements and the manner of their interaction are unpredictable,
and likely to vary with each successive problem. Often the outcome will be de-
termined not by the abstract merits of a situation, but by the character of cer-




By comparison, the countervailing pressures on administrators
to protect speech are much less compelling. The interest in maxi-
mizing communication opportunities is an intangible one. The ab-
sence of the benefit of a given communication is not felt in the
same way that the inconvenience of a traffic jam is felt. If someone
does not hear an idea because a permit to speak is arbitrarily de-
nied, he is not likely to know that he has missed anything; if there
is a traffic jam on a very busy street, many people are likely to
become extremely frustrated. Similarly, if regulators require that a
demonstration be moved to a less desirable location, comparatively
few people are likely to become agitated.12 Thus, more people are
likely to be strongly and immediately affected by a disruption of
routine by state functions than are likely to be inconvenienced by
a loss of an opportunity to communicate. Moreover, because sup-
porters of an overregulated demonstration are usually compara-
tively few in number, they are not even likely to have enough polit-
ical "clout" to pressure forum regulators to be more responsive to
speech interests.
B. Disproportionate Sensitivity to Controversial Communication
If the most serious criticism that could be made of minimal
scrutiny is that it insulates official tendencies to impose unneces-
sary restriction, then it might arguably be a tolerable one. One
could make the intuitively plausible assumption that a bias toward
regulatory interests falls on all ideas evenly; thus, it would not ap-
pear to have a significant impact on the mix of ideas in the so-
called marketplace of ideas.124 However, the ultimate impact of re-
laxed scrutiny on the content of communication is not nearly as
even-handed as this intuitive reaction might suggest.1 25 Forum ad-
ministrators have incentives to watch with particular care for
speech activities that seem most likely to cause trouble. When they
identify such activities, they presumably regulate them most ag-
gressively. The impact of this incentive is neither content nor view-
123. See, e.g., Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F.
Supp. 667 (N.D. Il. 1976), which prohibited the city of Chicago from denying a permit for a
parade by a small number of blacks through an extremely hostile white neighborhood.
124. See Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CH. L. REV. 81, 101-02 (1978).
125. See Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 113, 130-31 (1981).
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point-neutral.
Since controversy frequently triggers strong emotional reac-
tions, it has a unique capacity to generate risks of civil disorder.
126
It can generate violent retaliatory responses from members of the
audience hostile to the message. It may also provoke unpredictable
behavior among sympathetic listeners. For example, it is easy to
imagine a demonstration to protest police brutality in which indi-
vidual members of the crowd react spontaneously to criticism of
police by throwing objects at nearby police officers detailed to di-
rect traffic. Commentators on the behavior of administrative agen-
cies suggest that forum regulators are likely to act aggressively to
minimize the risk of such trouble.127 Some believe that rather than
ignoring risks of trouble, administrators are inclined to act aggres-
sively to avoid those risks. For example, according to Professor
James A. Wilson: "That agencies are risk averse does not mean
that they are timid. Quite the contrary: their desire for autonomy,
for a stable environment, and for freedom for (sic) blame gives
these agencies a strong incentive to make rules and to exercise au-




The regulatory response to the threats of trouble inherent in
controversy is likely to be an aggressive imposition of restrictions
on any communication activities perceived as having controversial
content. Because controversial communication by its nature is ca-
pable of generating hostile response or other regulatory problems,
it becomes a kind of risk index for forum regulators who are struc-
turing a regulatory response to a given public assembly. When the
subject of the assembly seems quite controversial, intensive regula-
tory efforts can be expected to assure order is maintained. For ex-
ample, the scheduling of a demonstration by a group of self-styled
Nazis in a downtown area of any community inevitably invites an
126. This special ability of controversial issues to engender a particularized reaction in
its audience was a paramount consideration in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974), which upheld a transit authority's policy of selling advertising space on its vehi-
cles for commercial advertisements that excluded political and public issue advertising.
127. See generally, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (J. Wilson ed. 1980). See also Blasi,
Prior Restrictions on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1482, 1514 (1970) (concluding that
forum regulators tend to exaggerate the threat of trouble). Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior
Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 50 (1981) (under conditions of uncer-
tainty regarding consequences, both regulatory officials and judges tend to overestimate the
dangers of controversial speech).
128. The Politics of Regulation, supra note 131, at 377.
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aggressive regulatory response from officials responsible for making
sure no trouble occurs.
129
For a number of reasons, including those previously discussed,
it would also seem to be very likely that the regulatory response
will be disproportionate. Prior to a controversial demonstration,
officials must guess the magnitude of the threat of potential
trouble. If they underestimate the potential, they may be faced
with public disorder or property damage. The risk of disorder, dra-
matic disruption, and political outcry is likely to be even greater
than with communications in general. The chance of countervailing
political pressure is smaller. Here, the constituency for speech and
assembly is often a controversial minority. Thus, the inevitable
tendency is to overregulate.130 If there is overregulation, public re-
sponse is unlikely to be particularly significant. On the other hand,
if there is underregulation and trouble follows, serious criticism
may result, even to the point of jeopardizing the regulator's job.
An example of administrative overreaction to controversy ap-
pears in Tinker.1 31 As has previously been discussed,13 2 the school
officials asserted that they were afraid that the ideas expressed by
the anti-war armbands would trigger a strong, hostile response
from unsympathetic students. As a consequence, they attempted to
exclude the armbands from school premises. The likelihood that
this particular exclusion constituted an overreaction by officials
was indicated because on previous occasions, other extremely pro-
vocative communications had been allowed which did not generate
disruptions.
Tinker is distinct from more routine regulatory cases such as
Heffron because the school officials never attempted to conceal
their desire to exclude a specific idea from the school setting.1 33 On
the contrary, they identified the idea and explained that they
thought its expression would have a harmful impact on the educa-
tional environment. Presumably, because the Court was able to
identify the school administrators' decision as a possible overreac-
129. See D. HAMLIN, THE NAZI/SKOKIE CONFLICT (1980); see also N.Y. Times, July 10,
1978, at A14, col. 1 (account of a rally by self-styled Nazis held in downtown Chicago).
130. For a discussion of analogous regulatory behavior in the context of decision mak-
ing in the federal government, see Quirk, Food and Drug Administration, in THE POLITICS
OF REGULATION 191, 234 (J. Wilson ed. 1980).
131. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
132. See supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
133. 393 U.S. at 511.
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tion to a controversial idea, it felt compelled to employ a higher
level of judicial scrutiny.'
On the other hand, the Court's reaction to a ban on state
courthouse demonstrations in Cox II ignored a situation in which
the suppression of provocative speech, although not intentional,
was potentially just as serious. In Cox II, courthouse demonstra-
tions were banned because it was assumed that demonstrators who
articulated a position on the conduct of state judicial proceedings
would have a serious impact on such proceedings. The state legisla-
ture's desire to avoid this impact was so strong that it enacted a
restriction which banned virtually all courthouse demonstrations,
even those which would have no undesirable effects on judicial pro-
ceedings. Both the Court and the legislature were willing to pre-
sume that all demonstrations near courthouses would have an in-
tolerable impact on judicial proceedings no matter what the
circumstances.135
134. For a contrary view of Tinker, defending the latitude of school officials to control
communications as they deem necessary without judicial intervention, see Diamond, The
First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 Tax. L.
REv. 477 (1981).
135. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). Cox II might mistakenly be interpreted as a
case where the Court viewed itself as having a special knowledge about the problems of
judicial administration and was, therefore, capable of making an independent judgment.
The better view, however, identifies the case as one where the Court deferred to the legisla-
ture's determination that such demonstrations should be prohibited. The probability that
judicial deference controlled the outcome is even greater in light of the fact that the statu-
tory ban at issue was so broad that it reached non-disruptive demonstrations whose proxim-
ity to a courthouse might only create the mistaken public impression that they were influ-
encing judicial proceedings. Regardless of what actually motivated the Court to decide as it
did, this author views the level of scrutiny as minimal because the Court presumed harm
where none might exist, rather than requiring it to be proven.
The Court's most recent decision regarding courthouse demonstrations, United States v.
Grace, 103 S.Ct. 1702 (1983), supports the view that Cox II was an example of judicial
deference to legislative policy. In Grace, the Court held that a federal statute prohibiting
leafletting or picketing in the United States Supreme Court Building or on its grounds was
unconstitutional as applied to activities which took place on public sidewalks outside the
Court building. While the holding might seem inconsistent with the Court's approval of the
regulation at issue in Cox II, Grace should be recognized as a case where the Court made an
independent judgment and found that a presumption of harm to judicial administration was
inappropriate. Perhaps the Court felt justified in making this independent judgment be-
cause the members were all intimately familiar with the Court's building, its relationship to
the adjacent sidewalk, and the scant potential for harm to appellate proceedings posed by
nearby speech activities.
In Cox II, the Court refrained from making such an independent judgment. There the
Court was willing to defer to the state legislature's judgment, perhaps because the affected
courts were trial courts-vulnerable to disturbances by nearby public demonstrations. Seen
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Similarly, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Edu-
cator's Association136 the Court appeared to approve state action
which was largely motivated by a desire to avoid competition be-
tween competing unions. There, as we have seen, the Court upheld
a provision of a collective bargaining agreement which gave exclu-
sive teacher mailbox access to the recognized union. The state
claimed that exclusion from access of a rival union was necessary
to prevent the schools from becoming a "battlefield" of inter-union
rivalry. The Court accepted this claim in spite of the fact that
there was evidence indicating that simultaneous access by both un-
ions on previous occasions had not created any problems. Had the
Court insisted on a provable threat of disruption, the record sug-
gests that the Court might well have been forced to conclude that
the provision was unnecessary.
Examples of the great potential for administrative overreac-
tion to controversy appear in reported lower court opinions as well.
For example, in We've Carried the Rich v. City of Philadelphia,37
city officials denied a permit to a group seeking to hold a
counterdemonstration in close proximity to Philadelphia's bicen-
tennial celebration.138 The celebration was to be held in the down-
town area, but city officials offered the counterdemonstrators per-
mits for undesirable, if not inhospitable, neighborhood locations
far from the downtown area as possible sites for such a
demonstration.
In a decision adopting the city's preference for an. expansive
band of geographic separation between the bicentennial activities
and the proposed counterdemonstration, the district court em-
ployed reasoning suggestive of the thinking of city officials:
The influx of hundreds of thousands of people and thousands of vehicles
into the bicentennial area on July 4th will present traffic and crowd control
problems of the greatest magnitude. The additional burden of providing for
plaintiffs' groups on a separate march route in the impacted area may prove
insurmountable. Even peripheral contact between the two groups of marchers
in this light, the two cases are not necessarily incompatible.
136. 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983).
137. 414 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
138. Id. at 612-13. See also discussion of a police officer's suspicions about demonstra-
tors whom he viewed as "outsiders." Tatum v. Morton, 402 F. Supp. 719, 721-22 (D.D.C.
1974); see also Lipez, The Law of Demonstrations: The Demonstrators, The Police, The
Courts, 44 DEN. L.J. 499, 508-09 (1967) (public demonstrations require more sensitive police
handling).
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and/or spectators can cause confusion and affect the orderly progress of the
parades.
Furthermore, I cannot overlook the fact that the vast majority of the
people that day will be exercising First Amendment Rights by attending and
participating in the officially sponsored activities. It seems to me that they
ought to be free to do so without fear of interference from those who wish to
promote an opposing view.
Moreover, in light of the plaintiffs' militant attitude and provocative pos-
ture as exemplified in their broadside, common sense dictates that the two
parades should be kept separate in order to avoid any untoward incident
which would trigger a confrontation and disrupt the peaceful activities of ei-
ther or both groups.1 39
These risks sound significant, almost awesome, until one realizes
that there is no indication that either the city or the court made a
concrete inquiry into the risks actually posed by permitting the
counterdemonstration to be located in closer proximity to the main
demonstration. There seems to be a great deal of reliance on intui-
tive feelings about the inherent risk of a counterdemonstration,
but there is no parallel examination of the importance of the
counterdemonstrators' entitlement to reach their audience.
40
III. A PROPOSED CHANGE IN JUDICIAL REVIEW
The foregoing sections of this Article have focused on two phe-
nomena. First, they have identified the circumstances and policy
rationales underlying the use of low levels of judicial scrutiny. Sec-
ond, they have examined the strong motivations of forum regula-
tors to overregulate in an effort to avoid risks of trouble. These
phenomena combine to insulate overly restrictive forum regula-
tions from judicial review. So long as a forum restriction and sur-
rounding circumstances do fiot suggest intentional censorship or
are not so burdensome as to deny all audience access, it is unlikely
to be overturned by judicial decision. Thus, in Heffron, fairground
administrators, nervous about the potential of any activity to dis-
rupt fairgoers, were free to construct any plausible restriction on
peripatetic communications whether or not it was actually neces-
139. 414 F. Supp. at 613-14 (citations omitted).
140. For a case deciding a similar issue but employing a higher level of scrutiny, see Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ill. 1976)
(black demonstrators entitled to parade through hostile white community even though city




sary. Minimal judicial scrutiny assured that their efforts would be
likely to withstand legal attack.
To the extent that minimal scrutiny is responsible for insulat-
ing systematic overprotection of regulatory interests and underpro-
tection of speech, a modification would seem in order. Speech in-
terests are generally regarded as being so important that threats of
censorship are routinely given maximum scrutiny by the judiciary.
Moreover, controversy is generally regarded as the category of
communication most worthy of judicial protection.141 To the extent
that a low level of scrutiny allows officials to ignore these policy
priorities, it seems inconsistent with the basic framework of first
amendment jurisprudence.
The difficult question is how to modify judicial review of fo-
rum restrictions to achieve less skewed results. Some commenta-
tors suggest that there should simply be a uniformly high level of
judicial scrutiny in all speech regulation cases.'14 They would aban-
don the content distinction. This approach ignores the importance
of tailoring judicial review to the peculiarities of different kinds of
cases. The Supreme Court has not merely chosen between a high
level of scrutiny and a low level of scrutiny. This Article identifies
several levels of scrutiny that are presently employed.'43 They
range from the presumptive unconstitutionality of standardless
laws to the almost total deference to judgments of prison, military
and school officials. To argue for a uniform level of scrutiny asks
the Court to forego intermediate and lower levels of scrutiny in
individual cases when those levels of scrutiny may be all that is
required to assure that sound regulatory judgments have been
made.
One modification that might be considered would be an exten-
141. See the discussion in Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 96 (1972).
142. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 129, at 142-51.
143. The different levels of scrutiny are exemplified by the following cases: Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 44 (1938) (standardless law irrebuttably presumed unconstitu-
tional); Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. School Dist. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (discrimination against
particular idea in absence of factual showing of justification by government); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (fiat ban on speech balanced against competing state interests
without need of supporting evidence from either side); Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (content-neutral regulation of access presumed
valid unless speaker presents evidence of content discrimination); Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (restrictions on content permissible in the context of
highly specialized governmental operations like prisons).
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sion of the "least restrictive means" approach to review of cases in
which forum restrictions containing clear standards are applied.
This approach is suggested by the Court's discussion in Schneider
v. State,144 finding a ban on all leafletting to be an impermissible
way to prevent littering. The Schneider Court evaluated the need
for the ban in light of alternative means that might have been em-
ployed to prevent littering. Such a level of scrutiny has the theo-
retical appeal of triggering an evaluative process that actively takes
available alternatives into account. Such an inquiry, earnestly
made, would presumably facilitate the identification and rejection
of restrictions that are unnecessary.
However, there is a problem with the "least restrictive means"
approach. Because it is largely based on the subjective assessment
of the viability of alternative ways to solve the same problem, it is
basically unstable. Each case employing such a standard turns on a
judicial assessment of the comparative merits of various alterna-
tives without the benefit of an evidentiary record showing the ac-
tual impact of each alternative. Thus, the outcome of such analysis
turns in large measure on judicial speculation.
It seems preferable to increase the level of scrutiny in public
forum cases by linking judicial decision making to an evidentiary
showing. Such an approach would have two consequences. First, it
would reduce judicial decision making based on speculation about
the effects of particular forum restrictions. Second, it would en-
courage more reliable regulatory decision making by providing in-
centives to ground forum restrictions on an evidentiary base that
could withstand increased judicial scrutiny. Ultimately, the ap-
proach would offset incentives toward overregulation by limiting
selection of forum restrictions to those that could be objectively
justified.
This approach does not significantly depart from the existing
framework of public forum decisions. In Tinker, the Court em-
ployed such an approach when reviewing a restriction that it
feared might be used to impose censorship.145 In order to minimize
speculation in administrative decision making, the Court specified
the evidentiary showing necessary to justify a restriction. In addi-
tion, it placed the burden of justification on the shoulders of school
144. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
145. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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officials in order to avoid regulatory decisions based solely on an
"undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance."''
A circumstance somewhat similar to the one that Tinker
sought to remedy is posed by the systematic propensity of forum
regulators to overprotect regulatory interests at the expense of all
speech, particularly controversial speech. Because of an "undiffer-
entiated fear or apprehension" of the risk of a disturbance or other
difficulty, forum regulators fail to carefully and neutrally balance
competing interests. As a means to offset the tendency of forum
regulators to overregulate speech activities, employment of the evi-
dentiary approach used in Tinker would seem to be effective. Such
an approach would replace the routine presumption that plausible
forum restrictions are sound accommodations of competing inter-
ests with a requirement that forum regulations be supported by an
appropriate showing of need. This would move the regulatory pro-
cess toward more even-handed outcomes and away from tendencies
toward overreaction that otherwise characterize regulatory decision
making.
There are, of course, problems with increasing the level of ju-
dicial scrutiny by extending Tinker to more routine regulatory de-
cisions. One of the most important of these problems is that any
increase in the level of scrutiny is likely to generate increased liti-
gation. This is because a high level of scrutiny decreases the cer-
tainty that forum regulators will prevail by increasing the possibil-
ity of successful court challenges to their decisions. Simply put,
forum users and their lawyers are likely to be sensitive to the in-
creased potential for successful litigation that increased judicial
scrutiny brings. Consequently, they are likely to file more lawsuits.
Increased litigation would place an increased burden on forum
administrators in several ways. It would require the commitment
of more time and money to the regulatory process. Administrators
would have to make decisions and keep records with a careful eye
toward the possibility of litigation. Thus, they would undoubtedly
find themselves making paper trails to support their regulatory de-
cisions by generating otherwise unnecessary documents that could
serve as objective evidence in the event of a lawsuit.
Increasing the level of scrutiny in public forum cases would
also increase the cost of deciding those cases for the judiciary. To
146. Id. at 508.
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the extent that increased scrutiny of a public forum decision gen-
erates the filing of additional cases, there will be proportionately
more time that would have to be spent by the judiciary in deciding
them. In addition, more time would also have to be spent on each
case tried or reviewed. More careful evaluation of government jus-
tifications for forum restrictions requires a more extensive review
of evidence. Both the increase in the number of cases and the in-
crease in reliance on evidence would require that the judiciary use
resources that are already in comparatively short supply.
47
Whether the benefit of increased judicial scrutiny is worth the
cost is basically a restatement of the policy question asking
whether speech interests should receive special constitutional pro-
tection or should be subject to the judgment of forum regulators.
The care which the Supreme Court has taken in developing the
time, place, and manner doctrine as a judicial tool for minimizing
arbitrary restrictions suggests that it is inclined toward the view
that constitutional policies favoring protection of speech should
override countervailing cost considerations. Indeed, the Court has,
on occasion, explicitly indicated that judicial review of forum re-
strictions must "weigh heavily the fact that communication is in-
volved.'1 48 However, the Court's language notwithstanding, its pre-
disposition toward employing minimal levels of scrutiny in routine
cases suggests strong reluctance to incur the additional costs inher-
ent in more active judicial review.
An application of the Tinker approach to the record in Hef-
fron suggests that while increased scrutiny may impose increased
litigation costs, they will not necessarily be excessive. The Heffron
Court upheld a restriction confining all political and religious
leafletting, literature sales, and religious fundraising to a fixed lo-
cation by presuming the soundness of the regulation even though it
allowed peripatetic oral proselytizing. It could have increased the
level of scrutiny by placing a burden on state fair officials to prove
147. The increased cost of litigation created by an enlarged number of cases filed is to
be distinguished from the increased cost created by the need for additional judicial re-
sources in order to decide each case. A higher level of judicial scrutiny would increase the
number of cases filed because protectors would see a greater number of circumstances in
which a lawsuit challenging a forum restriction would be successful. The need for additional
judicial resources in each case would arise because the court would require evidence from
the parties more frequently, and would need additional time to hear and review that
evidence.
148. Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
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that the activities regulated were as disruptive to crowd control as
claimed. Such proof might have come in the form of expert affida-
vits or the testimony from experts or persons who witnessed the
effects of Krishna religious activities at the fair.
In light of the existing record, a heavy burden on fair officials
might well have required the Court to invalidate the application of
the fairground restrictions to the Krishnas. There was no evidence
that their activities would have actually interfered with crowd con-
trol. Nor is there any indication that there was evidence available
that would have enabled the showing to be made. The apparently
arbitrary regulatory decision to prefer proselytizing over leaflet-
ting, suggests that no evidence showed that leafletting was particu-
larly disruptive. The absence of evidence of disruption from litera-
ture sales and fund solicitation similarly suggests that these
restrictions might have been unnecessary. Placement of an eviden-
tiary burden on the state would have tested the, accuracy of each of
these possibilities.
Had the Court required such evidence, it is unlikely that the
contours of the litigation would have been altered radically. If ad-
ditional evidence had been submitted in the form of affidavits, the
increase in resources necessary to litigate and decide the case in all
likelihood would have been minor. The preparation and analysis of
such documents is usually one of the less time consuming aspects
of litigation. If the additional evidence had been in the form of live
testimony, more lawyer and judicial time might have been required
to present and decide the case. Even so, the additional trial time
would probably not have been particularly significant. Evidence
pertaining to crowd disruption would have required the state to
present a few experts and perhaps some occurrence witnesses in
support of its case. Because most available experts are likely to be
state regulatory and law enforcement officials who regularly deal
with such problems, the state has near-monopoly of expertise and
experience with crowd control problems, the Krishnas' response
would have largely been confined to cross-examination of state wit-
nesses. Thus, while there would have been some increase in the
cost of proceedings to create an evidentiary record, it does not
seem inordinate. In addition, it would have conferred the benefit of
assuring that official decision making was not purely speculative or
intuitive.
The closest that the Court has come to employing an approach
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similar to that used in Tinker was the recent case of United States
v. Grace.149 In that case, the Court held that a federal statute
prohibiting the "display [of] any flag, banner or device designed or
adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or
movement" in the United States Supreme Court Building or on its
grounds including adjacent public sidewalks could not be constitu-
tionally applied to picketing on the public sidewalks. The Court
refused to assume the soundness of the legislative judgment under-
lying the statute. Instead, it looked to the record for palpable evi-
dence of harm and concluded that "[tihere is no suggestion ...
that appellees' activities in any way obstructed the sidewalks or
access to the Building, threatened injury to any person or prop-
erty, or in any way interfered with the orderly administration of
the building or other parts of the grounds."'150
Unfortunately, it is doubtful that the Grace decision signifies a
shift in the Court's approach to reviewing public forum cases. In
Grace, automatic deference to the legislature's judgment would
have been unlikely due to the special features of the case. The
members of the Court worked in the building which the statute
protected. They were personally familiar with the premises, the
sidewalks, and any possible effects of speech activities on their de-
liberations. In light of their specialized knowledge, the Court's in-
formation about the issue was far more complete than the
legislature's. 15'
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has shown that in public forum cases
where there are no obvious indications of censorship, the Court has
tended to defer to regulatory judgments of forum regulators wher-
ever possible. This has occurred because the Court has assumed
that officials who were not obviously censoring were probably mak-
ing regulatory decisions which reflected a sound balance of regula-
tory and speech interests. This assumption is incorrect. Regulatory
officials are risk avoiders just like everyone else, and are therefore
inclined to restrict speech activities whenever they become appre-
hensive that trouble might occur, however remote the possibility.
149. United States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct. 1702 (1983).
150. Id. at 1709, citing 40 U.S.C. § 13k (1976).
151. See supra note 135 (explaining that Grace does not overrule Cox II).
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The Court's deference to official judgments insulates most regula-
tory decisions from significant judicial scrutiny and thereby allows
and probably encourages decision making which unnecessarily bur-
dens speech activities.
The obvious remedy is to increase scrutiny in a fashion that
more carefully links specific factual considerations to judicial deci-
sion making and minimizes opportunities for speculation. Such an
approach would tend to stabilize decision making in a way that will
result in implementation of fewer unnecessary public forum re-
strictions. It would also insure that the constitutional interests in
maximizing speech opportunities and minimizing unnecessary con-
straints on controversial speech are given the weight to which they
are entitled.
